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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - USE IN STATE PROSECUTION
OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL INVASION OF PRIVACY-
While the defendant was away, police officers, suspecting him of
bookmaking, made a key to his home, entered, concealed a microphone
in the hall, bored a hole through the roof and attached the phone to a
wire which ran to a nearby garage where officers listened in relays.
They used the key again to move the phone into the bedroom- and
later into a bedroom closet. After listening for over twenty-five days
and hearing some incriminating statements, the officers used their
key to enter, arrested defendant and, without a search warrant, ran-
sacked'the house. Defendant objected to the admission of the testi-
mony on the grounds that it was obtained by methods which violate
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The testimony
was admitted and defendant was found guilty. His conviction wasg af-
firmed by the California Supreme Court and the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. Held (5-4),1 affirmed. The use of this
illegally obtained evidence does not violate the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381
(1954).
Effective protection of basic civil liberties often conflicts with so-
ciety's interest in efficient law enforcement. This is especially true
with respect to the freedom from unreasonable search and seizire
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment2 of the United States Constitu-
tion. The substantive content of this freedom, the conduct which
courts have held to be proscribed by the Amendment, represents a
compromise between the concern for individual liberty and the desire
for vigorous law enforcement. 3 Sanctions to prevent certain police
activities have been developed under the stress of this clash of policies.
In 1914 the federal courts resolved the conflict in favor of the ag-
grieved defendant and excluded from evidence the fruits of an illegal
search conducted by federal officers,4 in a belief that this was ,tIe only
effective way to make the Amendment meaningful.5 A simle]: rule of
1. Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the court; Black, Burton, Douglas
and Frankfurter, JJ., dissented.
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
." U.S. CoNST. AmEND. IV.
3. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 283, 69
L. Ed. 543, 549 (1925).
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652
(1914). The rule that such evidence is to be excluded is now embodied in the
FED. R. CanvRi. P. 41 (e).
5. Id. at 393.
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inadmissability is accepted in only about one-third of the states, 6 not-
withstanding the appearance of provisions similar to the Fourth
Amendment in all state constitutions.7
In 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,8 the Supreme Court was faced with the
question of the extent to which the sanctions of the Fourth Amend-
ment were to be enforced against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 The Court reasoned that the right of privacy against
the arbitrary intrusion by police, basic to a free society and protected
by. the Fourteenth Amendment, is enforceable against the states
through the due process clause, so that "affirmative sanction" by a
state of such illegal search would violate that clause. However, the
federal rule which would exclude evidence obtained through an un-
reasonable search by federal officers from use in a federal prosecution
is a rule of procedure for the federal courts only. Not an intrinsic part
of- the Fourth Amendment, the rule is not applicable to the state
courts.1 0
Three years later the Court interjected a new element into the prob-
lem of the propriety of the use of illegally obtained evidence. The
standards of due process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment were
held in Rochin v. California" to require the reversal of a conviction
based upon evidence of capsules containing narcotics which state offi-
cers observed the accused swallow after they illegally forced their
way into his room, and which they recovered by forcibly carrying
him to a hospital and pumping his stomach against his will. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Frankfurter said that due process of law was
not heedless of the means by which evidence was obtained and con-
cluded that the conduct shown did more than offend "fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism,"'12 it amounted to methods
which were shocking to the judicial conscience. Analogizing the con-
fession cases,13 the Court held that a state cannot resort to methods
that offend civilized standards of decency and fair play.'4
6. See Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 1364,
93 L. Ed. 1782, 1788 (1949).
7. E.g., "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." DEL. CONST. Art.
I, § 6. "That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." TENN. CONST. Art.
I, §7. The constitutional provisions are collected in CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND
SEauRE § 2 (2d ed. 1930).
8. 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949).
9. "[N] or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
10. The rule of the Wolf case was reaffirmed in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117, 73 Sup. Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951).
11. 342 U.S. 165, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952).
12. Id. at 172.
13. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).
14. Deprecating the vagueness of the test of due process set up by the ma-
jority, Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in separate opinions, expressed
the view that the Fifth Amendment protecting against self-incrimination should
be enforced against the states, and that the use of the capsules forcibly taken
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The majority distinguished the instant case from the Rochin case
on the ground that physical coercion and brutality to the person were
the factors requiring exclusion of the evidence there.15 Although the
Court found the conduct "incredible," as the factors of coercion and
brutality were absent, the Wolf decision was controlling. The dis-
senters believed that Rochin's requirement - "States in their prosecu-
tions [must] respect certain decencies of civilized conduct"' 6 -had
not been met.
The Supreme Court, realizing that the chief burden of administering
criminal justice rests upon the states, has consistently refused to inter-
fere except in the most extreme cases, and in this situation has drawn
the line at brutality or physical coercion. In arriving at this more
definite standard the majority seems to be slighting its duty to protect
the civil liberties necessary to the free society which the Bill of
Rights envisaged.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
Pursuant to the federal Anti-Narcotics Act,' defendant was indicted
for selling heroin. On direct examination defendant asserted he had
never possessed or sold narcotics. On cross examination defendant
denied an unlawful seizure of other heroin suppressed under an
earlier federal indictment against defendant. Over his objection
evidence of this prior possession of heroin obtained by the unlawful
search and seizure was admitted solely to impeach his credibility.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's conviction of de-
fendant. On certiorari, held, affirmed. Unlawfully seized evidence
of prior possession of heroin may be used to impeach the defendant's
credibility as a witness when he asserts on direct examination that
he has never possessed narcotics. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
74 Sup. Ct. 354 (1954).
It is well-settled in the federal courts that evidence obtained from
a defendant in contravention of the Fourth Amendment 2 is inad-
missible to aid in the establishment of guilt.3 The instant case pre-
in this case amounted to self-incrimination under that amendment. 342 U.S.
at 174, 177.
15. See instant case, 74 Sup. Ct. at 383.
16. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 210, 96 L. Ed. 183,
190 (1952).
1. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2550(a), 2554(a) (1946).
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . .
U.S. CONST. AmEND. IV.
3. For the historical development of this rule, see Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886); Weeks v. United States,
1954]
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sents the -problem of whether the defendant's testimony may necessi-
tate the admission of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment
purposes. The probative value of evidence obtained by an unlawful
search and seizure is impaired only by the method of obtention.
4
Since. suppression of the evidence is contingent upon a violation of
the .Fourth Amendment, the right to suppress the evidence is a
personal privilege possessed only by the aggrieved party.5 Moreover,
the defendant must be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
ixiVoling federal agency,6 - and the right of suppression may be
wai;d.7 Urider Rule 41 (e) the normal procedure for suppression is
by motion before trial.i The Government has been precluded from
u§ifig illegally obtained evidence affirmatively in its case in chief
ard in-, rebuttal to questions answered on cross examination;10 nor
may -it use knowledge gained through the unlawful search and
seizure."
232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C
1177 (1914); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed.
647 (1921); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed.
436 (1948). See appendix of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 175, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947), for an
analysis of cases involving unlawful searches and seizures.
.4: Fvidence obtained-by an unlawful search and seizure is reliable. Atkin-
son; A'dmissibility of Eiiidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 25' COL. L. RiV9 11, 12 (1925). It does not bear the taint of coerced
confessions. Cowen, The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal
Searches and Seizures 'in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions, 5 VAND. L.
Rzv. 523, 527 (1952).
5. Scoggins v. United States, 202 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Harvey v.
United States, 193 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir.)', cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952);
Ingram v. United States, -113 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940); Connolly v. Medalie 58
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932). But cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 Sup.
Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 59 (1951).
6: If -not obtained by an agency of the Federal Government, the evidence
will be admitted. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574,
65 L. Ed. 1048, 13 A.L.R. 1159 (1921) (evidence obtained by private individ-
uals); Lotto v. United States, 157 F.2d 623 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
811 (1946) (evidence obtained by state police); Robinson v. United States
292 Fed. 683 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 264'U.S. 580 (1923) (evidence obtained
by state officials); Hirata v. United States, 290 Fed. 197 (9th Cir. 1923) (evi-
dence obtained by city officers); Kanellos v. United States, 282 Fed. 461 (4th
Cir. 1922) (evidence obtained by state constable). But cf. Gambino v. Umted
States, 275 U.S. 310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137, 72 L. Ed. 293, 52 A.L.R. 1381 (1927);
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520 (1927).
7. Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 48 Sup. Ct. 77, 72 L. Ed. 186
(1927); Butler v. United States, 153 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1946); Moore v.
Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939); United States v. Edmonds, 100 F.
Supp. 862 (D.D.C. 1951).
8. "The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity
therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the
motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial
or hearing." FED. R. Canm. P. 41 (e).
9. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436
(1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654
(1921).
10. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51
A.L.R. 409 (1925).
11. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct.
182, 64 L. Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426 (1920).
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The Fourth Amendment is a protection of the right of privacy, and
in effect.is a refusal to subjugate the liberty of citizens to the discre-
tion of federal agents.12 As a matter of effective law enforcement, the
Supreme Court has asserted that the requisite of a valid search war-
rant is not unreasonable when the fundamental right to be secure
against unlawful obtrusion is at stake.13 The federal courts destroy
the immediate utility of evidence obtained from a defendant by an
unlawful search and seizure in order to preserve the efficacy of the
Fourth Amendment.1 4 The majority, of the states, 5 many of which
have constitutional provisions similar to the Fourth Amendment,
follow the common law'16 and refuse to inquire into how evidence
of probative value was obtained. The conflict is between the exi-
gencies of providing the courts with the truth and protecting the
right of privacy.
1'7
The Court in the instant case was faced with the dilemma of either
admitting uncontradicted the perjurious testimony of the defendant 8
or impeaching his testimony by evidence normally inadmissible.
Incentive to. diverge from the rule of exclusion was afforded by the
fact that the defendant voluntarily created the necessity.of using
the illegally obtained evidence. 9 If-the defendant had not testified
on direct examination as to prior possession of heroin, the evidence
would have been inadmissible for any purpose.20 The Court in the
12. For the historical background and interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, see LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRTH- AMND-
MENT (1937); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV.
361 (1921); Trimble, Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment as
Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, 41 Ky. L.J. 196, 388 (1953),
42 Ky. L.J: 197 (1954).
13. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436
(1948). "No reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except, the
inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to 'prepare
papers and present the evidence to a magistrate." Id. at 15.
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652,
L.R.A. 1915B 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1177 (1914). "If letters and private docu-
ments can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no
value, and . . .might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393.
15. For a summary of state decisions favoring and disfavoring the federal
rule, see appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93
L. Ed. 1782 (1949); Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case,
23 MICH. L.'REv. 748, 764-74 (1925).
16. Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Metc.) 329 (1841); 1 GPEENLEAF,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 254 (a) (16th ed. 1899).
17. The impact of the federal rule is clearly shown in contraband cases
where frequently dismissal or conviction is determined by the legality of the
search and seizure. For a critical examination of the federal rule, see 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2183, 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
18. The defendant in one proceeding asserted he was unlawfully dispos-
sessed of heroin and in the instant case denied the occurrence of the same
transaction. Instant case, 347 U.S. at 64.
19. "[Tlhe defendant went beyond a mere denial of complicity in the
crimes of which he was charged and made the sweeping claim that he had
never dealt in or possessed any narcotics." Instant case, 347 U.S. at 65.
20. The evidence was of no value to aid in the establishment of guilt. The
1954]
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instant case recognizes the fact that a defendant by his testimony
on direct examination may waive the right to object to the admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In
Agnello v. United States,21 the Supreme Court said, "In his direct
examination, Agnello... did not testify concerning the can of cocaine.
... He did nothing to waive his constitutional protection.
'22
A defendant who willingly takes the witness stand is subject to
cross examination concerning statements made on direct examina-
tion and may be impeached as any other witness.24 Therefore, the
questions asked on cross examination by the Government in the
instant case were proper, and the defendant was subject to impeach-
ment if the questions were falsely answered. The fact that the im-
peachment evidence was unlawfully obtained could not be objected
to by the defendant since his testimony on direct examination im-
pelled the use of the evidence and amounted to a waiver of the right
to suppress the evidence obtained in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment. It seems that the holding in the instant case would
be valid even where the evidence admitted for impeachment purposes
was of probative value in the establishment of guilt.25 The instant
case would seem to place a desirable limitation on the protection
afforded defendants under the Fourth Amendment.
Government could not use the evidence to discredit the defendant's testimony
on cross examination without his testimony on direct examination. Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409 (1925).
21. 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409 (1925).
22. Id. at 35. It is important to note that the defendant in the instant case
did not waive the Fourth Amendment but merely the right to object to the
admission of the evidence obtained in violation of the Amendment. The
defendant had this right to object since he successfully exercised it in the
former proceeding. Instant case, 347 U.S. at 62, 63. But the defendant's
testimony on direct examination caused the waiver of his right to object
which was effectuated by this testimony being a contradiction of the defend-
ant's assertions in the former proceeding.
23. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497, 46 Sup. Ct. 566, 70 L. Ed.
1054 (1926); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314, 32 Sup. Ct. 281, 56
L. Ed. 448 (1912); Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315, 20 Sup. Ct.
944, 44 L. Ed. 1078 (1900); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305, 15
Sup. Ct. 610, 39 L. Ed. 709 (1895).
24. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305, 15 Sup. Ct. 610, 39 L. Ed.
709 (1895); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 890 (3d ed. 1940).




EVIDENCE-RADAR EVIDENCE OF SPEED-COINCIDENCE OF
RADAR AND SPEEDOMETER READINGS AS HEARSAY
The defendant was prosecuted for speeding. The evidence consisted
only of the recording of a radar machine installed in a police car
parked along the edge of the road. The machine had been tested
several times earlier in the day by an arrangement whereby A, a
police officer, drove past B, in the radar car, and reported by radio
to B his speedometer reading and B told A the reading on the radar
dial. A testified that his speed on these occasions, concurred with the
speedometer dial reading as reported to him by B. B also testified
that the radar dial reading agreed with the speed as reported to him
by A. The prosecution, in an additional effort to establish the accu-
racy of the machine, offered the testimony of C, a third police officer,
who had installed the machine. C had no formal training in engineer-
ing or electronics. The trial court was not satisfied with the quali-
fication of C. Both sides moved for an adjournment in order to
produce an expert. The motions were denied and the court then
permitted C to testify over objections of the defendant. C's testimony
included an opinion as to the accuracy of the machine. The defendant
was convicted, and appealed. Held, reversed. The hearsay elements
vitiated the testimony of A and B. The failure to adjourn was an
abuse of discretion since the judge had voiced his displeasure at the
ability of C to qualify as an expert witness and there was no new
discovery of any previously latent qualification in C. People v. Offer-
mann, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
The testimony includes an assertion by A that he correctly reported
his speedometer reading to B and also an assertion by B that he cor-
rectly reported the machine reading to A. A is not testifying as to
the truth of B's assertion nor is B as to the truth of A's assertion, but
rather their testimony concerns their respective present memory of
a past event. Several tests were made but neither A nor B purported
to divulge the exact speed recorded. Their memory is only concerned
with the fact of coincidence. The reliable element in each of the
tests was the fact that both A and B perceived, by a nexus between
their auditory and visual sensations, that there was an exact similarity.
This perception is the subject of their testimony and both can be
6ross-examined as to it. Therefore, it could be argued that such
testimony is not hearsay evidence' and would not be subject to the
1. Notice how such testimony would not come within the following defini-
tion. "Hearsay is defined so as to include evidence of all conduct of a person,
verbal or nonverbal, when (1) intended to operate as an assertion and offered
either to prove the truth of the matter asserted or to prove that the asserter
believed the asserted matter to be true, unless the assertion is subject to
cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered at the trial at
which it is offered, or (2) not intended to operate as an assertion and offered
19541
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proscriptions generally incumbent upon hearsay.
Practically all courts would hold that A's testimony concerning the
dial reading was hearsay-" and should be inadmissible unless it falls
within a recognized exception to the rule.8 One of these exceptions
is based on the theory of spontaneous contemporaneous declarations.4
Thayer supported this exception by emphasizing the strong argument
for authenticity due to the contemporaneousness of the statement
involved.5 , Wigmore's theory of spontaneous declarations demands
that the statement be made while the declarant is still under the
influence of a startling occasion.6 But in accord with Thayer it has
been advanced that spontaneity, coupled with the facility and possi-
bility of. cross-examining the witness as to the original occurrence,
should be sufficient to bring the declaration in as an exception 8 It
has been held that it need only be "sufficiently spontaneous to save it
from the suspicion of being manufactured evidence. There was no
time for a calculated stutement."9 In the present case since neither
either to prove both his belief and the external event or condition which
caused him to have that belief or to prove that such conduct truly reflected
his belief." Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HAxv. L. REV. 1138, 1158
(1935).
2. "Hearsay has been defined as evidence which derives its value, not
solely from the credit to be given to the witness upon the stand, but in part
from the veracity and competency of some other person." 20 Am. Jun., Evi-
dence § 451 (1939). "The theory of the Hearsay rule is that the many pos-
sible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which
lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought
to light and exposed by the test of Cross-examination." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENc E
§ 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
3. For a general discussion see 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-27 (3d ed.
1940).
4. This relates to the circumstantial probability of trustworthiness "[Wihere
the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate statement would
naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed." 5 id. § 1422.
5. "The leading notion in the doctrine.. . seems to have been that of with-
drawing from the operation of the hearsay rule declarations of fact which
were very near in time to that which they tended to prove, fill out, or illus-
trate,-being at the same time not narrative, but importing what was then
present or but just gone by, and so was open, either immediately or in the
indications of it, to the observation of the witness who testifies to the declara-
tion, and who can be cross-examined as to these indications." Thayer, Bed-
ingfield's Case,-Declarations are Part of the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REV.
71, 107 (1881), reprinted in LEGAL EssAYs 207, 302 (1927).
6. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1750 (3d ed. 1940). See also National Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co. v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80 S.W.2d 92 (1935); Garrison v. State,
163 Tenn. 108, 40 S.W.2d 1009 (1931).
7. "The general rule is that the declarations must be substantially con-
temporaneous with the litigated transaction, and be the instinctive spontaneous
utterances of the mind while under the active, immediate influences of the
transaction; the circumstances precluding the idea that the utterances are the
result of reflection or design to make false or self-serving declarations."
State v. McDaniel, 68 S.C. 304, 47 S.E. 384, 386, 102 Am. St. Rep. 661 (1904).
8. See Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236-37 (1922). See also Hart v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 144 N.C. 91, 56 S.E. 558 (1907); Marks v. I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203
S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1943); State v. Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624
(1938); Missouri Pac. Ry. and I. & G.N. Ry. v. Collier, 62 Tex. 318 (1884).




A nor B could see what the other was observing, their testimony
would not be admissible under a strict construction of Thayer's
theory. But the courts have at times ignored the fact that the testi-
fying witness could not observe the thing declared.0 The testimony
of a bystander who heard another call out a license number has been
held admissible."
Another pertinent species of contemporaneous declarations is that
type- of direct declaration 12 of a mental condition existing at the
moment, where there are no surrounding circumstances that would
lend credence to suspicion.'3 In the principal case, at the time the
declarations were made, neither A nor B had a motive to deceive,
but rather had a special motive to report accurately; nor did either
have time to plan an incorrect statement. Setting aside the possibility
of deceit it can be pointed out that the accuracy of the declarations
would be assured by their contemporaneity. It thus appears that the
declarations in question would not be to any great extent subject
to the hearsay dangers of vocabulary, sincerity, memory and percep-
tion.
14
Another pertinent phase of the case at hand revolves around the
problem of establishing the accuracy of the electronic device by
expert witness testimony. 5 The method involving expert witnesses
is best illustrated for purposes of the present case by turning to other
modern machines and systems employed in police work. The quali-
fication of expert's opinion in the lie detector situation is highly
controversial. The expert involved there needs to be highly pro-
ficient.'0 An expert in the field of ballistics is generally held to be
one who is well qualified by benefit of both his experience and train-
ing.'7 These rules as to the ability prerequisite to qualify as an expert
are brought to the fore in cases involving fingerprint classification. 8
10. See Britton v. Washington Water Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, 110 Pac. 20,
22, 33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 109 (1910).
11. Chalmers v. Anthony, 8 N.J. Misc. 775, 151 Atl. 549 (Sup. Ct. 1930);
Rathbun v. Brancatella, 93 N.J.L. 222. 107 Atl. 279 (1919).
12. See Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as
Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 233-36 (1922).
13. For situations in which the circumstances were not suspicious and the
evidence was admitted, see Brannen v. Bouley, 272 Mass. 67, 172 N.E. 104
(1930); Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208 (1889); Swartz v. Kay,
89 W. Va. 641, 109 S.E. 822 (1921). See 6 WIGMORE, EVIENCE § 1729 (2) (3d ed.
1940).
14. For a discussion of hearsay dangers see Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HTARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
15. "A witness is an expert witness and is qualified to give expert testi-
mony if the judge finds that to perceive, know or understand the matter
concerning which the witness is to testify requires special knowledge, skill,
experience or training, and that the witness has the requisite special knowl-
edge, skill, experience or training." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 402 (1942).
16. See Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22
TENN. L. RaV. 711, 726-27 (1953).
17. See Note, 66 A.L.R. 373 (1929).
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The problem involved in qualifying electronic speed detection de-
vices can be solved by securing witnesses who are more than in-
stallers 9 and can testify in detail as to construction, operation and
purpose of the machine.20 In the future the necessity of establishing
the accuracy of such devices by expert witnesses may be dispensed
with by an act of the legislature or by gaining such recognition as
to come within the purview of judicial notice.
21
FEDERAL COURTS-STATE NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE-
WAIVER OF FEDERAL VENUE PRIVILEGE
Plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, brought action against Indiana
residents in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky for damages caused by the collision of defendant's truck
with plaintiff's railroad overpass in Kentucky. Defendant's motion
to dismiss for improper venue was overruled on the ground that
venue had been waived under the Kentucky nonresident motorist
statute.1 Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit.2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held
18. See Leonard v. State, 18 Ala. App. 427, 93 So. 56, 57 (1922) (five years
practical experience in such identification); Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198
Pac. 288, 290-91, 16 A.L.R. 362 (1921); Hopkins v. State, 174 Ark. 391, 295
S.W. 361, 362 (1927) (witness identified members of jury by their finger-
prints).
19. The court in the instant case felt that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in not granting a motion for adjournment to secure experts. Instant
case, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
20. "[I]t was established by proof of high quality that the device used
fulfilled the function for which it was designed and was mechanically suffi-
cient at the time it was used in connection with appellant's apprehension."
Carrier v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Ky. 1951). "The State pro-
duced an expert who testified in detail regarding the construction, the
operation and the purpose of the Speed Meter, its margin of error if properly
functioning, and the ways and means of testing its accuracy." State v. Moffitt,
100 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1953).
21. "If the common law is to grow through adaptation to changing condi-
tions by means of judicial decision, the device by which knowledge of the
changed conditions becomes part of the court's working equipment is judicial
notice." Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HAnv. L. Ray. 269, 289 (1944).
1. "Any nonresident operator or owner of any motor vehicle who accepts
the privilege extended by the laws of this state to nonresidents to operate
motor vehicles or have them operated within this state shall, by such accept-
ance and by the operation of such motor vehicle within this state, make the
Secretary of State his agent for the service of process in any civil action insti-
tuted in the courts of this state against the operator or owner arising out of
or by reason of any accident or collision or damage occurring within this
state in which the motor vehicle is involved." Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 188.020
(Baldwin 1943). For a collection of nonresident motorist statutes of other
states, see 4 VAND. L. Ray. 698, 699 (1951).
2. 201 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1953).
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(7-2),3 reversed. The federal venue privilege4 is not waived by the
operation of a motor vehicle in a state which by statute designates an
agent to accept service of process on nonresident motorists. Olberding
v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 74 Sup. Ct. 83 (1953).
Since the famous case of Hess v. Pawloski5 there is no doubt of the
constitutional validity of nonresident motorist statutes.6 Nor is there
any question that federal courts have jurisdiction in those cases7 where
the requirements of diversity and jurisdictional amount are satisfied.
When both parties are nonresidents, however, and the action is brought
in a federal court of the situs of the accident, the federal venue statute
creates a serious problem.
Prior to the instant case, many lower federal courts had concluded
that a nonresident motorist waived his federal venue privilege8 by
the voluntary act of driving on the state's highways. The motorist was
presumed to have knowledge of the consequent designation of an agent
to accept service of process.9 These courts have found the distinction
between express and implied appointment of an agent unsubstantial,
particularly in view of Kane v. New Jersey,0 which upheld a penal
statute forbidding the use of the state's highways by nonresident
motorists until formal appointment of a process agent was made. They
also regard as unsubstantial the distinction between a corporate de-
3. Opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter; dissent by Mr. Justice Reed, with
Mr. Justice Minton concurring.
4. "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citi-
zenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U.S.C.A. §
1391 (a) (1950). But it is a personal privilege which a party may assert or
may waive at his election. It may be lost by failure to assert it seasonably, by
formal submission in a cause or by submission through conduct. Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167
(1939).
5. 274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
6. 9 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 5913 (Perm. ed. 1941);
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 200-04 (3d ed. 1949); 15-16 HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA
OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 82 (9th ed. 1931); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
84 (Supp. 1948); Notes, 138 A.L.R. 1464 (1942), 99 A.L.R. 130 (1935). The
statute must provide a reasonable means of communicating the service of
summons to the defendant, however, or it will be unconstitutional. Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A.L.R. 1230 (1928). See
RESTATEMENT, JUDGiENTS § 23, comment c (1942).
7. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1949).
8. Burke v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Ga. 1953), 39 VA. L. REV. 985;
Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co., 109 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1953), 38 CORNELL
L.Q. 624, 28 NOTRE DAME LAW. 567; Archambeau v. Emerson, 108 F. Supp. 28
(W.D. Mich. 1952); Jacobson v. Schuman, 105 F. Supp. 483 (D. Vt. 1952);
Garcia v. Frausto, 97 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo. 1951); Kostamo v. Brorby, 95 F.
Supp. 806 (D. Neb. 1951); Burnett v. Swenson, 95 F. Supp. 524 (W.D. Okla.
1951); Thurman v. Consolidated School Dist., 94 F. Supp. 616 (D. Kan. 1950);
Urso v. Scales, 90 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88
F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1950); Blunda v. Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mo. 1947);
Steele v. Dennis, 62 F. Supp. 73 (D. Mo. 1945); Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp.
708 (E.D.S.C. 1943).
9. See Kostamo v. Brorby, 95 F. Supp. 806 (D. Neb. 1951), 4 ALA. L. REV.
127, 39 GEo. L.J. 648, 27 N.D.L. REV. 352.
10. 242 U.S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed 222 (1916).
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fendant, doing business with a state, and an individual's act of driving
through the state," and rely upon Knott Corp. v. Furman12 as authority
for finding that consent to be sued in the courts of a state carries with
it a consent to be sued in the federal courts within the state if the
elements of federal jurisdiction are present. In that case a state statute
provided that a corporation doing business within the state should
be deemed to have appointed a process agent; the statutory appoint-
ment of an agent resulting from the doing of business was held to
constitute a waiver of federal venue.
Extensive reasoning has been advanced to substantiate the holding
that federal venue is not waived by mere operation of a motor vehicle
in a state having a nonresident motorist statute.13 There is no express
consent to be sued in federal court, and the concept of implied consent
is considered "fictive."'14 The true basis for state jurisdiction in these
cases is not consent at all, but the doing of a dangerous act within
the state.15 Therefore, it is reasoned, consent is immaterial, and there
is no waiver of federal venue. To hold otherwise would allow state
legislation to modify or repeal a Congressional statute on the venue
of federal courts.16 Yet even under this theory a waiver may be found
where, as in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,'7 there has
been a formal express authorization of a process agent within the
state. Decisions in accord with the instant case make a distinction be-
tween express and implied designation of an agent. One is a consensual
act which will constitute a waiver; the other is a nonconsensual act
from which no waiver will be found.
In saying that the defendant as a nonresident has a personal privilege
which may not be lost by implied authorization of a process agent,
the majority of the Court in the instant case would seem to be correct
in stating that the nonresident motorist statute "has nothing whatever
11. See Urso v. Scales, 90 F. Supp. 653, 655 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Krueger v.
Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708, 710 (E.D.S.C. 1943).
12. 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947), 61 HARV.
L. REV. 723, 33 VA. L. REv. 812, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 195 (1948).
13. McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1953), 3 BUFFALO L. REV. 148;
Martin v. Fishbach Trucking Co., 183 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950), 39 GEo. L.J. 143
(1950), 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 559 (1951), 13 GA. B.J. 491 (1951), 26 IND. L.J.
285 (1951), 36 IowA L. REv. 705 (1951), 49 MICH. L. Ray. 1072 (1951), 35 M N.
L. REv. 404 (1951), 24 So. CALwF. L. REV. 498 (1951), 3 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1951),
36 VA. L. REV. 1102 (1950); Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tenn.
1950), 4 VAND L. Rav. 698 (1951), 39 ILL. B.J. 383 (1951), 29 TEXAS L. REV. 964
(1951).
14. Instant case, 346 U.S. at 341. See McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498, 499 (3d
Cir. 1953); Scott, Jurisdiction of Nonresident Motorists, 39 HAIIv. L. Ray. 563,
573 (1926).
15. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT or LAWS 200-04 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGmENTS § 23 (1942).
16. See McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498, 499 (3d Cir. 1953).
17. 308 U.S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939), 19 Car-KENT REV. 135
(1940), 53 HARv. L. REv. 660 (1940), 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1047 (1940), 88 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 485 (1940), 7 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 397 (1940), 49 YALE L.J. 724 (1940).
See also 2 VAND. L. Rav. 481 (1949).
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to do -with his rights under... 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (a)."18 -The distinc-
tion resorted to by the Court, however, between the two courses of
conduct - express designation of a process agent in the Neirbo case
and operation of a motor vehicle in the instant case - seems somewhat
tenuous. In neither situation is there an express waiver of the federal
privilege, merely a submission to suit in the courts of the state.19
Perhaps some policy considerations are involved. The practical
value of laying venue at the situs of the accident in automobile neglig-
ence cases is apparent; the expense and inconvenience of taking deposi-
tions may reduce the efficiency of trial. While one of the purposes
behind Section 1391 (a) was to save the defendant from inconveni-
ence,20 it does not seem that any undue advantage was intended. In
strictly applying the venue statute the Court has left to Congress the
question of whether nonresident motorists should continue to receive
more favorable treatment than foreign corporations.21
FEDERAL JURISDICTION- DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-
RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS TO PERFECT JURISDICTION
Plaintiff, a Texas resident, brought action in the state court against
two foreign insurance companies and their Texas agent. The insurance
companies removed the case to the federal court on the basis of di-
versity of citizenship, and plaintiff's motion to remand was overruled.
The trial resulted in a verdict against the present defendant which
then asserted a lack of federal jurisdiction. On certiorari, the Su-
preme Court held there was no diversity jurisdiction.' After allowing
plaintiff to dismiss the agent and the other insurance company and to
amend the pleadings, the district court held that prior to the amend-
ment it had been wholly without jurisdiction and ordered a new trial.
18. Instant case, 346 U.S. at 341. See also Lied Motor Car Co. v. Maxey,
208 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1953) (follows the instant case).
19. In the Neirbo case the defendant had designated "William J. Brown as
the person upon whom a summons may be served within the state of New
York." Compare the form of the designation in the Kentucky nonresident
motorist statute, note 1 supra. In the absence of independant information it
seems quite unlikely that the defendant made a conscious waiver of federal
venue.
20. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168, 60
Sup. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939).
21. A corporation is now subject to suit in any judicial district in which it
is doing business. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (c). (1950).
1. Finn v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 341 U.S. 6, 71 Sup. Ct. 534, 95 L. Ed.
702 (1951), 40 CALF. L. REv. 317 (1952), 46 ILL. L. REV. 335 (1951), 35 MARQ.
L. REV. 308 (1952), 49 Mcn. L. REV. 1236 (1951), 23 Mxhss. L.J. 150 (1952),
3 SYRACUSE L. REv. 177 (1951), 30 TEx. L. REV. 372 (1952), 20 U. OF Cmn. L. REV.
522 (1951), 100 U. OF PA. L. REV. 277 (1951). Because of the expense of a second
trial the court was criticized for not ordering a direct appeal of jurisdiction
before trial. 50 MICH. L. REv. 475 (1952).
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Plaintiff appealed contending that judgment should have been awarded
on the original virdict. Held, reversed and remanded with instructions
to enter judgment on the original verdict. Federal jurisdiction was
retroactively perfected by the amended pleading, and the district court
had discretion to order a new trial or to enter judgment on the original
verdict. Finn v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 207 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.
1953).
When a diversity case is filed in the federal court, the jurisdiction of
the court can be later perfected by a dismissal of parties who are not
indispensable.2 In a situation like that in the instant case, either of
two courses of action is within the discretion of a federal court. It
may grant a new trial,3 or it may award judgment on the original ver-
dict in the absence of prejudice at the trial to the remaining defendant
because of the presence of those parties subsequently dismissed.
4
Awarding judgment on the original verdict is patently a logical in-
consistency. The action of a court without jurisdiction to act is null
and void.5 Thus, in a case in the federal court based on diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, when after trial and verdict, it is determined
that the federal court did not have jurisdiction because of a lack of
the necessary diversity, the result of the trial is void. But when the
court thereafter dismisses the parties who are not indispensable6 and
allows amendments to the pleadings,7 its jurisdiction is thereby per-
fected retroactively to the filing of the complaint. 8 The purpose of the
retroactive effect of amendments is to toll the statutes of limitation
on the theory that "a party who is notified of litigation concerning a
given transaction or occurrence is entitled to no more protection from
statutes of limitation than one who is informed of the precise legal
2. Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570, 21 L. Ed. 657 (1873) ;.Mason v. Dullagham,
82 Fed. 689 (7th Cir. 1897); Weaver v. Marcus, 165 F.2d 862, 175 A.L.R. 1305
(4th Cir. 1948); O'Neal v. National Cylinder Gas Co., 103 F. Supp. 720 (N.D.
Ill. 1952); States v. John F. Daly, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Xassner
v. United States Pictures, 82 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
3. Dollar S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Merz, 68 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1934).
4. Alderman v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 125 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1942); Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 121 F.2d
561 (8th Cir. 1941); Levering and Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 287 U.S. 590 (1932), ajfd, 289 U.S. 103 (1933). Contra:
Dollar S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Merz, supra note 3.
5. Coleman Bros. Corp. v. City of Franklin, 58 F. Supp. 551 (D.N.H.),
af'd and rev'd in part on other grounds, 152 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 844 (1946); State ex rel. Callahan v. Hess, 348 Mo. 388, 153
S.W.2d 713 (1941); Corey v. Hardison, 236 N.C. 147, 72 S.E.2d 416 (1953);
Ex parte Hart, 186 S.C. 125, 195 S.E. 253 (1938).
6. Parties who are not indispensable are denominated "formal" or "neces-
sary" parties. DOBIE, HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 214(1928).
7. FED. R. Ci. P. 15.
8. Levering v. Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 287 U.S. 590 (1932), affd, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); Interstate Refineries,
Inc. v. Barry, 7 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1925); O'Neal v. National Cylinder Gas Co.,
103 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ill. 1952); States v. John F. Daly, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 479
(E.D. Pa. 1951); Gate-Way, Inc. v Hillgren, 82 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1949),
ajFd, 181 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1950); 66 HARv. L. REv. 928 (1953).
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description, of the rights sought to be enforced." 9 Once the concept
of the retroactive effect of amendments has been recognized it follows
that amendments to correct jurisdictional defects may be said-to make
jurisdiction retroactive to the time the case reaches the federal court. 10
Logically, that permits giving effect to a trial which theretofore had
been a nullity.
The more expeditious method of settling the rights of the parties
would be to grant judgment on the verdict if no prejudice is found
because of the presence at the trial of those subsequently dismissed.
If prejudice is found, a new trial would be mandatory. Though this
might appear to be a bandying of the concept of jurisdiction, practical
considerations of promptness and dispatch in the administration of
justice come to the fore. The doctrine of retroactive jurisdiction comes,
finally, to be a device employable for the reduction of the, workload
of federal courts in these cases by making possible the elimination of
a second trial and a saving of time, effort and expense.
The unusual facts of the instant case are of interest in that the plain-
tiff had not sought federal jurisdiction and had opposed it until the
trial was had and a favorable verdict delivered. Thereupon, the de-
fendant insurance company against whom the verdict was found re-
versed its position and questioned federal jurisdiction and was not
estopped from so doing. After a final determination that the federal
court had no jurisdiction in the case, the plaintiff was free to determine
whether to seek to cure the jurisdictional defect or to have the case
remanded to the state court. A second trial was in fact conducted
with a less favorable verdict for plaintiff. The court of appeals, find-
ing that the second trial was ordered because of a mistake of law,
exercised the discretion of the district court and determined that the
second trial was unnecessary and awarded judgment on the verdict
reached at the first trial.
The inference from the instant case may be that entry of judgment
on the verdict at the first trial in the absence of prejudice to the re-
maining defendant is required. That such is the inference of the case
is the thesis of the dissenting opinion.1 No case can be found which
supports such a doctrine which, in effect, would carry the concept
of retroactive jurisdiction to its logical conclusion. The better view,
and the holding of the court in the instant case, inter alia, is to leave
the decision to grant a new trial or to enter judgment on the original
verdict to the sound discretion of the trial court.12 Review can be had
for an abuse of discretion or if the decision were based on a mistake
9. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 851 (2d ed. 1948).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (c); see note 8 supra.
11. Instant case, 207 F.2d at 117.
12. See note 4 supra.
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of law.13 This would afford maximum protection to the parties. In any
event, an order for a new trial would not be entirely outside the bounds
of reason. A new trial would obviously be necessary in a state court
if federal jurisdiction could not be attained.
INCOME TAXATION - DEDUCTIONS - PERIODIC ALIMONY PAYMENTS
Taxpayer's divorce settlement provided, inter alia, that he would
pay his wife $300 per month for 5 years, but if she remarried or either
party died, payments were to cease. The Tax Court held that since the
sum total was mathematically calculable, these payments were not
periodic within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code Section 22 (k) .1
Held, reversed. The contingency of the wife's remarriage or the death
of either party rendered taxpayer's promise incapable of mathematical
calculation and the payments were, therefore, periodic within the
meaning of Section 22 (k). Estate of Smith v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953).
Congress provided in 19422 that periodic alimony payments received
by a divorced wife are to be included in her gross income 3 and de-
ducted from the husband's gross income 4 if paid pursuant to a divorce
decree5 or under a written instrument incident thereto. If, however,
the husband is ordered to pay a specified amount to the wife in install-
ments, the installments are not periodic payments unless they are to
continue for more than ten years.6 The ten year requirement was de-
signed to prevent the husband from obtaining deductions for lump
13. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct.
811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940); Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287
U.S. 474, 53 Sup. Ct. 252, 77 L. Ed. 439 (1933); 3 AM. JuR., Appeal and Error
§ 981 (1936).
1. The husband cannot deduct alimony payments unless they are included
in wife's gross income under § 22 (k). INT. REV. CODE § 23 (u). But see Selig-
mann v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953) (wife need not include
alimony payments although husband allowed a deduction).
2. Prior to 1942 alimony payments were generally taxed to the husband.
Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 80 L. Ed. 3 (1935); Gould v.
Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 Sup. Ct. 53, 62 L. Ed. 211 (1917).
3. "In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally separated from her
husband under a decree of divorce ... periodic payments ... received subse-
quent to such decree in discharge of ... a legal obligation which.., is imposed
upon or incurred by such husband under such decree or under a written instru-
ment incident to such divorce ... shall be includible in the gross income of
such wife .... " INT. Ray. CODE § 22 (k).
4. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (u).
5. On January 18, 1954 the House Ways and Means Committee voted to give
the same treatment to periodic payments made by the husbands to a wife
under a separation agreement where they are living apart and have not yet
filed a joint return for the year even though they are not yet separated under
a court decree. 4 P-H 1954 FED. TAX SERv. 1 66,520 (1954).
6. INT. REv. CODE § 22 (k).
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sum settlements through the obvious device of spreading the lump
sum over a relatively short term of years.
In the leading case of J. B. Steine17 the taxpayer agreed to pay his
wife $100'rmonthly until $9,500 had been paid, but if she died or re-
married before the full amount had been paid, payments were to cease.
It was contended by the taxpayer that the obligation to pay a specific
amount must be unconditional before the payments were installments
on a lump sum, rather than periodic indefinite payments. While con-
ceding the taxpayer had a plausible argument, the Tax Court held the
payments nondeductible, since there was nothing in the statute itself
or in its legislative history requiring the obligation to pay a specified
sum to be unconditional. It was but a small step for the Tax Court to
next hold the payments were installments and not periodic when the
lump sum was not specified in the decree, but only a mathematical
calculation was needed to determine it.8 It was to no avail that one
ingenious taxpayer persuaded the divorce court to enter a nunc pro
tunc order altering the divorce decree to read that the payments were
periodic and not installments. The Tax Court held that since the pay-
ments were otherwise within the Steinel rule, they were taxable to the
husband and the nunc pro tunc order had no effect in determining his
tax liability.9 But if the amount of alimony is contingent upon the
husband's earnings, the sum total is not mathematically calculable and
the payments are periodic within the meaning of Section 22 (k).10
It was -in the face of this background that the Baker" case went
contra to all prior Tax Court decisions and held that the obligation to
pay a specified amount must be unconditional, else the payments are
periodic and deductible by the husband. The Commissioner in the in-
stant case relied upon the previous Tax Court decisions and could
only argue that the Baker case was decided incorrectly. In rejecting
the Commissioner's contentions and holding the contingencies of re-
marriage and death sufficient to render agreements to pay a specified
amount incapable of mathematical calculation, the instant case opens
up hitherto unobtainable deductions for the alimony-paying husbarid.
But when it is remembered that Congress denied deduction of install-
ment payments in order to deter the bunching of alimony payments
in a short period of time it seems the instant case follows the letter
and not the spirit of Section 22 (k).
7. 10 T.C. 409 (1948); see Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14 T.C. 1356
(1950).
8. Estate of Orsatti, 12 T.C.- 188 (1949); Benjamin Davidson, P-H 1952
TC MEM. DEC. 1 52,326; Edwin T. Heath, P-H 1952 TC MEM. DEC. 52,141;
Horace M. Read, P-H 1951 TC MA-vr. DEC. 11 51,124; Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C.
1308 (1950).
9. Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949).
10. John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834 (1948); Roland Keith Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948).
11. 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
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LABOR LAW-PRE-EMPTIVE EFFECT OF .TAFT-HARTLEY-
SCOPE OF STATE JURISDICTION
Respondent union was enjoined by a Pennsylvania equity court
from peacefully picketing petitioners' premises for the purpose of
coercing petitioners to compel their employees to join the union.
The state supreme court reversed on the ground that the NLRB had
jurisdiction of petitioners' trucking business and that the federal
remredy was exclusive. On certiorari.to United States Supreme Court,
held, affirmed; The union activity here in question fell within an
area pre-empted by Congressional legislation; the Federal Board's
primaryj jurisdiction to vindicate the public right supersedes the power
of the state to enforce any private right involved. Garner v. Team-
sters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776 (AFL), 74 Sup. Ct.
161 (U.S. 1953).
The narrow holding in the Garner case represents another positive
limitation on the power of the states to adjudicate controversies aris-
ing out of labor relations affecting interstate commerce.1 The decision
that the state courts may not enjoin peaceful picketing which amounts
to an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act had been
anticipated by commentators in the field of Labor Law.2 The decision
is in harmony with the trend of modern Supreme Court decisions
widening the field within which Congressional legislation is held to
have precluded state regulation 3 Indeed, the result reached in the
Garner cage was presaged by numerous lower court decisions to the
1. See generally on federal-state jurisdiction. Cox and Seidman, Federalism
and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REV. 211 (1950); Feldblum, Jurisdictional
"Tideldnds" in Labor Relations, 3 LABOR L.J. 114 (1952); Forrester, The
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEmP. PaoB.
114 (1948); Hall, The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Reulation, 1 J. PUBLIC LAW
97 (1952); Handler, The Impact of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947 upon the Jurisdiction of State Courts over Union Activities, 26 TEMP.
L.Q. 111 (1952); Hornbein, The Extent to which Taft-Hartley Has Superseded
State Labor Laws, 28 DICTA 47 (1051); Meyers, The Taft-Hartley Act and
States' Rights, 3 LABoa L.J. 325 (1952); Petro, State Jurisdiction to Regulate
Violent Picketing, 3 LABoR L.J. 3 (1952); Petro, State Jurisdiction to Control
Recognition Picketing, 2 LABOR L.J. 883 (1951); Petro, Participation by the
States in the Enforcement and Development of National Labor Policy, 28
NOTE DA1wm LAW. 1 (1952); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction
in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 750 (1952); Rice, A Paradox of Our National
Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L. REv. 233 (1951); Rose, The Labor Management Re-
lations Act and the States' Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. REv. 765 (1953);
Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations,
46 MICH. L. REv. 593 (1948); Teller, The Taft-Hartley Act and Government
by Injunction, 1 LABOR L.J. 40 (1949); Wallace, The Contract Cause of Action
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 16 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1949); Note, 27 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 468 (1952); Comment, 20 U. or CHI. L. REv. 109 (1952).
2. Hall, The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Regulation, 1 J. PUBLIC LAW 97
(1952); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,
3 LABOR L.J. 750 (1952); Handler, The Impact of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 upon the Jurisdiction of State Courts over Union Activi-
ties, 26 TEMP. L.Q. 111, 121-22 (1952).
3. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
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same effect. , It is well-settled that when Congress, in the.exercise
of its commerce power, embarks upon -a comprehensive prograin of
regulation with the intention that such regulation shall be exclusive,
the states may not through their legislative or judicial departments,
act "in coincidence with, as complementary to, or as in opposition
to" such federal regulation.5 The instant case is an authoritative
determination that, as to ordinary peaceful picketing which- falls
within the union unfair labor practice provisions of the Taft-Eiartley
Act, Congress has so acted.6
Although there is no Supreme Court decision squarely' in point,7
dicta in recent decisions sustain the power of the states to protect
the person and property rights of their citizens from unlawful con-
duct, notwithstanding that such conduct is the subject of federal
legislation s Likewise, in the instant case, the Court carefully dis-
Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 71 Sup. Ct. 359, 95 L. Ed. 364 (1951);
International Union. UAW, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 70 Sup. Ct. 781, 94
L. Ed. 978 (1950); Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 338
U.S. 953, 70 Sup. Ct. 491, 94 L. Ed. 588 (1950); La Crosse Telephone Corp. v.
Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 18, 69 Sup. Ct. 379, 93 L. Ed. 463 (1949);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026, 91 L. Ed. 1234 (1947); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson,
325 U.S. 538, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373, 89 L. Ed. 1782 (1945). But cf. International.
Union UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 69 Sup. Ct.' 516,
93 L. Ed. 651 (1949); Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel.
Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 69 Sup. Ct. 584, 93 L. Ed. 691 (1949); Allen-Bradley Local
No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 62 Sup. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed.
1154 (1942).
4. Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. granted,
346 U.S. 936 (1954); Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119,
194 P.2d 689 (1948); McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 89 A.2d
566 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 913 (1953); Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas,
232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1950); Costaro v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.2d
454 (1951); Alonzo v. Industrial Container Corp., 193 Misc. 100.8, 85 N.Y.S.2a
835 (Sup. Ct. 1949). But cf. Sommer v. Metal Trades Council; 40 Cal.2d 392,
254 P.2d 559 (1953); Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 673, 102 N.E.2d 833
(1951).
5. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 345-46, 47 Sup. Ct. 383,
71 L. Ed. 672 (1927); Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furn.
Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604, 35 Sup. Ct. 715, 59-L. Ed. 1137 (1915); Houston -v.
Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 20-23, 5 L. Ed. 19 (U.S. 1820).
6. Montgomery Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co.,
33 LRRM 2659 (Ala. 1954).
7. In Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 62 Sup. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942), a state court injunction against
mass picketing and threatened violence was upheld, but the significance of
the holding is weakened perhaps by the fact that it was rendered prior to,
Taft-Hartley when coercion and restraint of non-strikers was not -a union
unfair labor practice. Handler, The Impact of the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act of 1947 upon the Jurisdiction of State Courts over Union Activi-
ties, 26 TEmvip, L.Q. 111, 112 (1952); Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor
Relations, 64 HARV. L. REv. 211, 231 (1950)..
8. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 71 Sup. Ct. 961,
95 L. Ed. 1277 (1951); International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Emp.
Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949). Cf. NLRB v. Fan-
steel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. 627 (1939)
(sit-down strike in context of violence held to be outside the protection .of
the rights conferred by Section 7 of Wagner'Act).
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tinguished the Garner facts from those presenting actual or threatened
breaches of the peace, interferences with the use of public thorough-
fares or picketing of private domiciles State courts have exhibited
no hesitation in assuming jurisdiction over mass picketing and picket-
line vidence.10 Although such conduct is frequently an 8(b) (1)
violation,1 state jurisdiction can be justified on the ground that the
Taft-Hartley Act represents Congressional regulation only in the field
of labor relations. Although states are thereby precluded from ap-
plying their labor law in controversies affecting interstate commerce,
their power to preserve the peace remains intact even though it be
invoked in connection with a labor dispute' 2 The principle is firmly
entrenched in our constitutional law that Congressional intent to
suspend the "police power" of the states is not to be lightly inferred.13
This principle is significant in the labor field in light of the fact that
under the present Federal law union activity is unlawful only as it
is engaged in for one of the purposes enumerated in Section 8 (b) of
Taft-Tartley.14 It would seem that state controls directed as confirm-
ing union activity within the standards of conduct required of all
citizens rather than at outlawing the objectives of such activity,
encounter no problem of federal pre-emption."5 Any argument for
invalidating state action curtailing violence in a given situation must
allege as its basis a conflict between such action and the broad policy
statements found in Sections 1 and 7 of the Federal Act, a conflict
seldom likely to exist.
9. Instant case, 74 Sup. Ct. at 164.
10. Russell v. International Union, UAW, 258 Ala. 615, 64 So.2d 384 (1953);
Oil Workers International Union v. Superior Court, Contra Costa County,
103 Cal. App.2d 512, 230 P.2d 71 (1951); Williams v. Cedartown Textiles, Inc.,
208 Ga. 659, 68 S.E.2d 705 (1952); Art Steel Co. v. Velazquez, 109 N.Y.S.2d
788 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Erwin Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 234 N.C.
321, 67 S.E.2d 372 (1951); Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 369
Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1952); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum
Construction Corp., 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953), cert. granted, 346 U.S.
936 (1954). See also Irving Subway Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp.
671 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Cortlandt Co. Dep't Store, Inc. v. Cohen, 127 N.Y.S.2d
261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
11. "(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents: (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 ... " 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §
158(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1953).
12. Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 3
LABoR L.J. 750, 761-62 (1952).
13. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614, 60 Sup. Ct. 726, 84 L. Ed. 969
(1940); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 9-12, 58 Sup. Ct. 87, 82 L. Ed. 3
(1937); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611, 47 Sup. Ct.
207, 71 L. Ed. 432 (1926); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533, 32 Sup. Ct. 715,
56 L. Ed. 1182 (1912); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47
L. Ed. 108 (1902).
-14. 61 STAT. 141, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (1947).
15. Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REv.
211, 236 (1950); Petro, State Jurisdiction to Regulate Violent Picketing, 3
LABOR L.J. 3 (1952); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor
Relations, 3 LABOR L.J. 750, 761-62 (1952).
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State regulation of peaceful concerted activity outside the unfair
practice provisions of the Federal Act, on the other hand, seems con-
siderably less justifiable. The Court in the instant case intimates that
the same result would have obtained had the conduct not been an
8 (b) violation, on the theory that picketing uncondemned by LMRA
is Congressionally sanctioned activity beyond the scope of permissible
state regulation.' 6 It is this aspect of the Garner decision which
promises to be most provocative of future litigation. In the Briggs-
Stratton case a state court injunction forbidding recurrent brief work
stoppages unattended by intimidatory activity was affirmed on the
ground that "This conduct is governable by the State or it is entirely
ungoverned."'1 7 This result was reached in the face of several deter-
minations by the Federal Board that such conduct was "concerted
activity" and within the protection of the Act.'8 Unlike the Allen-
Bradley9 decision, the Briggs-Stratton case was decided after Taft-
Hartley when the Court could have relied upon the union unfair
practice sections as indicative of pre-emption.2 0 Instead, the Court,
utilizing the objectives-means dichotomy reminiscent of the common
law, spoke in terms of conflict and determined that such was impos-
sible because Congress had not purported to regulate the "methods"
of concerted activity.21 It is significant that the Court found the type
of activity involved in Briggs-Stratton to be without the ambit of
protection afforded by the Federal Act, thus apparently preserving
to the states a limited power to prohibit unduly coercive and arbitrary
methods of economic pressure, even though such conduct falls short
of actual or threatened violence.
22
Perhaps the most litigious question raised by the Garner decision
relates to the power of the states to condemn concerted activity di-
rected toward the accomplishment of purposes not outlawed by
16. Instant case, 74 Sup. Ct. at 170-71.
17. International Union UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S.
245, 254, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949).
18. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 714 (1943); Cudahy Packing
Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 837 (1941); Armour & Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 989 (1940); The
Good Coal Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 136 (1939); Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676
(1938); American Manufacturing Concern, 7 N.L.R.B. 753 (1938). The court
distinguished these cases on the ground that they were isolated work stop-
pages.
19. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. .740,
62 Sup. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942).
20. Prior to LMRA the sanctions of federal legislation were directed only
against employer unfair labor practices. Handler, The Impact of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947 upon the Jurisdiction of State Courts over
Union Activities, 26 TMP. L.Q. 111, 112 (1952).
21. International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S.
245, 253-54, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949). This proposition is chal-
lenged by commentators on the ground that violence directed toward non-
strikers or replacements is a recognized 8(b) (1) (A) violation. Petro, State
Jurisdiction to Regulate Violent Picketing, 3 LABOR L.J. 3 (1952).
22. Cf. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct.
490, 83 L. Ed. 627 (1939) (sit-down strike held to be unprotected activity).
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Taft-Hartley, The typical example is that of peaceful picketing
engaged in for the purpose of forcing recognition where there is
no certified union. The states have tenaciously asserted power to
prohibit such organizational activity.23 The sweeping language of
the Garner decision,24 however, would seem to preclude state regu-
lation in this area. The rationale runs thus: Section 7 of the NLRA
confers upon employees the right to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining.25 Congress has itself qualified
that right by expressly spelling out, in the Taft-Hartley Act, certain
union unfair labor practices. 26 Congressional silence as to union
conduct not remediable under Taft-Hartley amounts to an expression
that the rights guaranteed in Section 7 shall not be further limited.
27
The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated state action which
"impairs, dilutes, qualifies . . . [or] subtracts from . . . the rights
guaranteed by the federal Act."28 Thus, states seeking to enlarge
the scope of illegal objectives of union pressure will apparently be
precluded even though such conduct might be neither condemned
nor expressly protected by the literal language of the federal legis-
lation.
In summary, notwithstanding a reaffirmation in the instant case
that the Taft-Hartley Act "leaves much to the states"29 it appears
that the only areas of labor relations affecting interstate commerce
in which the states may confidently act are those involving violence
or such unduly coercive conduct as may be brought within the nebu-
lous bounds of the Briggs-Stratton doctrine.
At the root of the federal-state jurisdictional problem are the con-
flicting interests of (1) the need for uniform substantive and pro-
cedural regulation in labor relations affecting interstate commerce
and, ultimately, the economic and social welfare of the nation; and
(2) the desire of the individual employer or group of employees for
the speedy adjudication of grievances in local common-law and
23. Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal.2d 392, 254 P.2d 559 (1953);
Goodwins v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 673, 102 N.E.2d 833 (1951); Hayes Freight
Lines, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 33 LRRM 2671 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).
24. "The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified
types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of
other methods and sources of restraint." (Instant case, 74 Sup. Ct. at 171.
25. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 157
(Supp. 1953).
26. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (Supp. 1953).
27. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 20-23, 5 L. Ed. 19 (U.S. 1820).
* 28. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Emp. Eel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740,
62 Sup. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942). See also Amalgamated Ass'n of Street,
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383,
71 Sup. Ct. 359, 95 L. Ed. 364 (1951); International Union, UAW, CIO v.
O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 70 Sup. Ct. 781, 94 L. Ed. 978 (1950); Plankington Pack-
ing Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Eel. Bd., 338 U.S. 953, 70 Sup. Ct. 491, 94 L. Ed.
588 (1950); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373, 89 L.
Ed. 1782 (1945).
29. Instant case, 74 Sup. Ct. at 164.
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equity courts. In preserving to the states the power to protect their
citizens from labor violence, but subjecting non-belligerent labor
controversies to the slower administrative process, the relevant Su-
preme Court decisions seem to have effected an allocation of juris-
diction calculated to assure the fullest possible protection to both
interests involved.
TORTS - DOG BITE- OWNER'S SCIENTER
Plaintiff brought an action to recover for injuries sustained by her
infant daughter, attacked without provocation by defendant's dog.
Several witnesses testified that defendant had warned them of
the dog's tendency to fight with another dog, thereby creating a risk
that children would be bitten. On appeal from a judgment for plain-
tiff, held (3-2), affirmed. The owner had knowledge of the dog's
propensity to attack children without provocation. Perkins v. Drury,
57 N.M. 269, 258 P.2d 379 (1953).
In general a dog owner, in the absence of negligence, is not answer-
able for its acts of viciousness unless he can be shown to have scienter,
that is knowledge, actual or constructive, of the dog's vicious propensi-
ties.' Where scienter is present, however, liability is generally said to
be imposed without fault 2 although there is authority to the contrary.
3
The instant case concerns the particular propensities of the dog upon
knowledge of which liability will be based in the event of a particular
type of injury. The authorities seem to agree that there must be a
showing of scienter of the dog's tendency to do the particular kind of
act which caused the injury.4 At common law, when the injury was
an attack on a human being, knowledge of a previous attack was ap-
parently necessary; hence arose the oft-repeated addage "every dog
is entitled to one bite."'5 This is no longer the law;6 today the theory
1. 3 C.J.S., Animals § 145 (1936); 2 Am. JuR., Animals §§ 48, 49 (1936);
PROSSER, TORTS 438 (1941).
2. Where the animal possesses known vicious propensities there is generally
thought to be negligence in keeping the animal at all, hence strict liability is
imposed. 3 C.J.S., Animals § 146 (1936); 2 Am. Jun., Animals §§ 48, 49 (1936);
PROSSER, TORTS 438 (1941).
3. Some cases take the view that negligence in failure to confine the animal
properly is requisite to the cause of action, but that a rebuttable presumption
to this effect is raised where injury follows the keeping of the animal of
known viciousness. 3 C.J.S., Animals § 146 (1936).
For an excellent review of the theory of the owner's liability under various
situations see McNeely, A Footnote on Dangerous Animals, 37 McE. L. Rsv.
1181 (1939). It is there suggested that where the injury occurs on the premises
of the owner, as in the instant case, negligence is essential. Id. at 1191.
4. 3 C.J.S., Animals § 148d(1) (1936); 2 Am. JuR., Animals §§ 48, 83 (1936);
PROSSER, TORTS 439 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 509, comment g (1938).
5. The statement is attributed to "the dog has the privilege of one worry,"
in Burton v. Moorhead, 8 Sess. Cas., 4th Ser., 892 (1881).
6. 3 C:J.S., Animals § 148d(1) (1936); 2 Am. Jun., Animals § 48 (1936);
PROSSER, TORTS 440 (1941).
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is that only such knowledge of the dog's propensities to do a particular
injury is required as would put a reasonable man on guard.7 Whatever
the reasonable man test may mean in a given situation, it has been
uniformly held that knowledge of the dog's propensity to fight with
dogs or other animals is not sufficient to show knowledge of a pro-
pensity to attack human beings.8
Although the plaintiff in the instant case is, by virtue of defendant's
failure to put on evidence, entitled to every reasonable inference,9 the
only knowledge in evidence was of the dog's propensity to fight with
another dog. The inference of knowledge of a propensity to attack
children from knowledge of a propensity to fight another dog seems to
be a clear departure from previous authorities. It represents a trend
in the common law toward making the owner an insurer of the dog's
malfeasance, the desirability of which is evidenced by the increasing
amount of legislation to this effect.10
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF
EMPLOYMENT -PRE-EXISTING HEART DISEASE
On the morning of a working day an employee with a pre-existing
heart condition suffered an attack while in bed at his home. Not-
withstanding the attack, the employee reported to his employer's
place of business where, engaged in his usual duties, he carried a
twelve to twenty-two pound skid some thirty feet when he collapsed
7. 3 C.J.S., Animals § 148d(1) (1936); 2 Am. Jun., Animals § 48 (1936);
PROSSER, ToRrs 440 (1941).
8. Hensley v. McBride, 112 Cal. App. 50, 296 Pac. 316 (1931); Keightlinger
v. Egan, 65 Ill. 235 (1872); Norris v. Warner, 59 Ill. App. 300 (1894); Fowler v.
Helck, 278 Ky. 361, 128 S.W.2d 564 (1939); Twigg v. Ryland, 62 Md. 380 (1884).
But knowledge that the dog will attack other dogs is sufficient where the
dog bites a person holding another dog. Hartman v. Aschaffenburg, 12 So.2d
282 (La. App. 1943).
9. Perkins v. Drury, 57 N.M. 269, 258 P.2d 379, 382 (1953).
10. See Smrn AND PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 674 (1952). The
statutes provide, in varying terms, that the owners or keepers of dogs shall be
liable for all injuries caused by the dog to another's person or property unless
the person who sustained the injury was committing a trespass or a tort.
E.g., N.H. REv. LAws c. 180, § 23 (1942); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 140, § 155 (1950).
Some states explicitly negative the necessity of proving viciousness and
scienter in order to recover damages. E.g., WIs. STAT. § 174.02 (1951). In any
case, such statutes are usually construed as creating a strict liability of owners
for the injuries caused by their dogs. Ingeneri v. Kluza, 129 Conn. 208, 27
A.2d 124, 142 A.L.R. 434 (1942); Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245, 198 N.E.
270 (1935). A minority, however, hold that it merely eliminates the necessity
of proving scienter when the dog commits a vicious act and that the owner
still will not be liable for nonvicious or innocent acts causing injury. Koetting
v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 270 N.W. 625 (1936). Contra: Bevin v. Griffiths, 44
Ohio App. 94, 184 N.E. 401 (1932).
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and died. Expert medical testimony established the cause of death
as coronary thrombosis, and rendered the opinion that any activity,
short of complete relaxation, would have aggravated his diseased con-
dition to the point of death. The lower court affirmed the award of
the Industrial Commission holding the death to be a compensable
injury under the statute.' Held, reversed. The death of the employee
did not result from injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment. Price v. B. F. Shaw Co., 77 S.E.2d 491 (S.C. 1953).
Workmen's compensation statutes were enacted to protect an em-
ployee by bestowing benefits 2 upon him when he is the victim of an
"injury by accident arising out of his employment." Today the "by
accident" requirement is generally held to be satisfied either if the
cause was of an accidental character, as normally understood, or if the
injurious effect was the unexpected result of the employee's perform-
ance of his routine duties.3 Injuries also are now generally held com-
pensable under the "arising out of employment" requirement 4 if the
employment aggravated or accelerated a disease producing the death
or disability. At least one state has seen fit to allow compensation
only for the percentage of disability directly attributable to the acci-
dent.
5
Much litigation has understandably arisen concerning the interpreta-
tion of the words "injury by accident" where the victim has suc-
cumbed to a heart attack. The battle has been pitched largely upon
either the unusual exertion doctrine6 or the unexpected result doc-
trine.7 The minority unusual exertion doctrine is founded upon the
presumption that death from a pre-existing heart disease results from
that disease; the burden of proof is on the claimant
8 to show an un-
1. "'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only that injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a
disease in any form, except when it results naturally and unavoidably from
the accident .... " S.C. Code § 72-74 (1952). Statutes with similar language
are found in many states. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6852(d) (Williams 1934); VA.
CODE §65-7 (1950).
2. 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORN.MEN'S COMPENSATION § 1 (1952); 1
SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1 (1941).
3. 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38 (1952).
4. Id. § 12.20.
5. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4663 (1937).
6. Cleary Bros. Const. Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525 (1945); Rue
v. Kentucky Stone Co., 313 Ky. 568, 232 S.W.2d 843 (1950); Rose v. City of
Fairmont, 140 Neb. 550, 300 N.W. 574 (1941); Lohndorf v. Peper Bros. Paint
Co., 134 N.J.L. 156, 46 A.2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1946); cf. Franklin v. United States
Bronze Powder Works, 6 N.J. Super. 320, 71 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1950).
7. McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1943);
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kitchens, 81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270 (1950);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rouse, 202 Okla. 395, 214 P.2d 251 (1951). "The basic and
indispensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpectedness." 1 LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORvMEN'S COMPENSATION § 37.20 (1952).
8. Lotndorff v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 134 N.J.L. 156, 46 A.2d 439 (Sup. Ct.
1946); See 6 RUTGERS L. REv. 629 (1952). "This [coronary thrombosis] is a
condition that ordinarily ensues from coronary schlerosis or other morbid
state. At all events, the presumption is that it was due solely to disease; and
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usual strain in order to rebut the presumption. The English courts9
and the majority of the American courts10 have tended to interpret
the statutes liberally so as to make compensable the injuries arising
out of an employee's usual duties, once these are established to be
the precipitating element" of th collapse. One court 12 has held heart
failure to be accidental even where the exertion was lighter than
usual but actually precipitated the attack.
The South Carolina court in the instant case12 clearly adopted the
minority rule by holding a disclosure of unusual exertion necessary to
recovery for an accidental injury to an employee afflicted with a pre-
existing heart disease. The dissenting opinion 14 properly stated the
majority view that there is a compensable accident when conditions
of employment accelerate the disabling or fatal condition which
results. The courts of New Jersey 5 and New York'6 had been the
the onus is on claimant to establish that the asserted accident was at least a
contributory cause without which the occlusion would not have occurred."
Schlegel v. H. Baron & Co., 130 N.J.L. 611, 34 A.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
9. Fenton v. Thorley & Co., Ltd., [1903] A.C. 443. "If in any employment
to which the Act applies personal injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer is . . .liable
to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. . . ." 34
HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND § 1136 (2d ed., Hailsham, 1940). See 1 LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORmViEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.10 n.12 (1952).
10. Willis v. Aiken County, 203 S.C. 96, 26 S.E.2d 313 (1943) (an officer
with pre-existing heart disease died as a result of accident by overexertion
in raiding a still which was performance within the scope of his employment).
Griggs v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1939)
(claimant with pre-existing high blood pressure and a diseased condition
of small arteries lifted a sack of cement; he recovered for a paralysis of his left
arm resulting from a ruptured blood vessel). "The 'by accident' requirement is
now deemed satisfied in most jurisdictions either if the cause was of an acci-
dental character or if the effect was the unexpected result of routine per-
formance of the claimant's duties. Accordingly, if the strain of claimant's usual
exertions causes collapse from heart weakness, back weakness, hernia and the
like, the injury is held accidental. A very substantial minority of jurisdictions
require a showing that the exertion was in some way unusual, or make other
reservations, but this line of decision causes difficulty because of the constant
necessity of drawing distinctions between usual and unusual strains." 1
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38 (1952).
11. McGregor & Pickett v. Arlington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1943);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Rouse, 202 Okla. 395, 214 P.2d 251 (1950); Willis v. Aiken County,
203 S.C. 96, 26 S.E.2d 313 (1943); cf. Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 260
S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. 1953). Contra: Rue v. Kentucky Stone Co., 232 S.W.2d 843
(Ky. 1950); State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153
S.W.2d 40 (1940). Cf. Lohndorff v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 134 N.J.L. 156, 46 A.2d
439 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
12. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas Co. v. Kitchens, 81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270
(1950).
13. Instant case, 77 S.E.2d at 496.
14. Id. at 497.
15. "The net result amounts to this: New York, beginning with an emphatic
requirement of unusual and even catastrophic cause, has, by a gradual dim-
inution of the 'unusualness' of the unusual cause required, reached a point
where, in effect, any heart attack contributed to by the employment seems to
be held accidental. New Jersey . . . continues to fill the reports with finely
balanced distinctions on what exertions are usual and what unusual in heart




outstanding leaders in the minority position of adhering to the an-
tiquated unusual exertion doctrine. It is significant that New York
has essentially abandoned the unusual exertion test17 and New Jersey
is beginning to retreat from its position.' 8
The humane spirit implicit in workmen's compensation statutes does
not justify an extension of the statutes beyond their scope, but it ap-
pears that the position taken by the majority of courts is desirable in
that it keeps within the primary objectives of the statutes, which are
"to improve the economic status of the worker; to obviate the uncer-
tainties, delay, expense, and hardship attendant upon the enforcement
of common-law remedies...." 19 Being remedial in nature the statutes
in general have properly received liberal construction of their terms
to achieve the enumerated objectives. Technical considerations of
fortuitousness and cause have not been allowed to defeat claims of em-
ployees in substantially similar situations. Unfortunately, the South
Carolina Supreme Court missed an excellent opportunity to place
that state among those following the unexpected result rule which
appears to be in keeping with the statutory objectives of workmen's
compensation legislation. 20
17. Broderick v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc. 277 App. Div. 422 100 N.Y.S.2d
837 (3d Dep't 1950). For a complete collection of cases that have developed
New York's present position and a discussion thereof see 1 LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.64 (a) (1952).
18. Carpenter v. Calco Chemical Division of American Cynamid Co., 4 N.J.
Super. 53, 66 A.2d 177 (App. Div. 1949). Contra: Schroeder v. Arthur Sales
Co. 5 N.J. Super. 287, 68 A.2d 878 (App. Div. 1949). See 1 LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKNIEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.64(b) (1952).
19. 58 Am. JUm., Workmen's Compensation § 2 (1948).
20. See note 7 supra.
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